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This research investigates how culture moderates the impact of risk on individual investors’ 
trading behavior in nine Eurozone countries, where risk is measured by conventional and 
extreme risk. These markets were particularly affected by the global financial crisis, the 
subsequent European banking crisis, and the European sovereign debt crisis. Using mutual fund 
flows as proxy of investors’ trading behavior, our evidence indicates that country culture 
variable significantly affects investor’ trading responsiveness to risk. Specifically, the impact of 
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This research investigates how culture moderates the impact of risk on individual investor’s 
trading behavior in nine Eurozone countries, where risk is measured by conventional and 
extreme risk. These markets were particularly affected by the global financial crisis, the 
subsequent European banking crisis, and the European sovereign debt crisis. Using mutual fund 
flows as proxy of investors’ trading behavior, our evidence indicates that country culture 
variable significantly affects investor’ trading responsiveness to risk. Specifically, the impact of 








How investors respond to risk has been a fundamental question in finance over the past 
several decades. Most studies that use the traditional volatility measure (standard deviation of 
stock returns) as it relates to investors’ trading behavior find mixed results. For instance, Sirri 
and Tufano (1998), Barber, Odean, and Zheng (2005), Spiegel and Zhang (2013), and Kim 
(2017) assert that fund flows are negatively related to risk. On the other hand, O’Neal (2004) 
and Cashman et al. (2014) show a positive relation between fund inflows and risk.  In a related 
vein, Clifford et al. (2013) show that fund inflows from small investors are positively related to 
unsystematic risk, while its relation to market risk is an open question. In a recent paper, 
Switzer et al. (2017) examine the responses of investors to both an extreme risk measure, and 
the traditional risk measure. They find that individual investors in G-7 countries have different 
reactions and sensitivities to these two types of risk. In this study, we use both traditional risk 
measure and extreme risk measure to study investors’ response for countries particularly 
affected by the global financial crisis, the subsequent European banking crisis, and the 
European sovereign debt crisis. Specifically, we construct standard risk measures based on the 
logarithmic percentage changes of stock prices over different holding periods, with the 
assumptions of normality and symmetry of return distribution and risk averse investors. The 
standard deviation of returns is also an essential component of the traditional value-at-risk 
(VaR) measure. Such risk has been the focus of regulators in seeking to establish how much 
financial institutions should put aside to guard against the types of financial and operational 
risks banks (and the whole economy) face. However, because the standard deviation does not 
capture the risk to the investor when the distribution is non-symmetric, the traditional methods 





are problematic, and need to be interpreted cautiously. Our second measure of risk, that focuses 
on the distribution around the tail, falls under the rubric of extreme value theory. Extreme risk 
observations are identified as the mild outliers in our samples, using the Tukey (1977) 
definition. They are computed using the percentage of extreme days, weeks, and months over a 
specific year. One advantage of this extreme measure is that we can decompose the total risk 
measure into a positive shock component and a negative shock component, so that we can 
observe accurately the behavior such investors whose utility responses to stock price change are 
asymmetric. Comparing the risks based on those two measures, our results show that the 
extreme measures do not always cohere with the classical standard deviation measure of risk for 
the countries considered.  
While previous literature focuses on large developed countries, we examine nine 
relatively small European countries in this study, since it is observed that those countries have 
amplified impacts from internal or external financial shocks for recent years. More specifically, 
during the Global Financial crisis of 2007-08 and its aftermath, as G-7 countries generally 
recovered, relatively small economies such as Belgium, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal became 
the main epicenters of continued instability. For example, two of Belgium’s largest banks: 
Fortis and Dexia, underwent reorganization and restructuring in order to survive. Fortis was 
spun off into two parts, while the Dutch group was nationalized and the Belgian component was 
sold to the French bank BNP Paribas. Ireland and Greece also went into a debt crisis in 2010. 
Allied Irish Bank and the Bank of Ireland received a €7 billion rescue package in 2009 and went 
into recapitalization. The four largest banks of Greece, National Bank of Greece SA, Piraeus 
Bank SA, Euro-bank Ergasias SA, and Alpha Bank AE, have been the regular recipients of 





cover its insolvent sovereign debt, drawing a €79 billion from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM), and the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF). The debt crises of Ireland, Greece and Portugal marked the start of the 
European sovereign debt crisis. One might posit that the behavior of investors in such countries 
experiencing protracted financial instability may not be consistent with those in larger countries 
that have more or less recovered. Therefore, in this paper, we focus on individual investors’ 
response to the two aforementioned risk measures in those nine relatively small Eurozone 
countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden 
that were epicenters of continued instability. By using mutual fund flow as proxy of individual 
investor’s trading behavior, our results show significantly different behavior of investors in 
those countries in terms of their sensitivity to risks. 
Why investors from those countries exhibit different responses to the same risk 
measures? This is a critical important research question addressed in this study. Previous 
literature in this line of research show cross-country investor behavioral variations. For 
example, Statman (2008) investigates twenty-two countries and identifies significant differences 
in stated propensities for risk taking of investors. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) emphasis 
culture variables in explaining stockholder’s behavior. Eun, Wang, and Xiao (2015) find that 
culture influences stock price synchronicity by affecting correlations in investors' trading 
activities and a country's information environment.  
While these studies typically show that individualism plays a significant role, they do 
not explore the actual trading behavior of market participants across different countries. Several 
researchers endeavor to ascertain the influence of such cultural dimension’s influence on 





score of 26 developed countries’ data, Chui et al. (2010) assert that country individualist score 
is positively related to trading volume, volatility, and the magnitude of momentum profits. 
Schmeling (2009) examines the impacts of investor sentiment on stock returns over 18 
industrialized countries and finds that sentiment negatively forecasts aggregate stock returns. 
Chang and Lin (2015) provide comparable results. According to their findings, national cultures 
are associated with investor herding behavior.  Such herding behavior is particularly observed in 
countries where Confucianism is dominant and in less sophisticated stock markets. Although 
these studies provide insights about how cultural factors influence overall investing activities in 
equity markets, they do not consider investors’ attitudes against risk. Our paper provides new 
evidence on this issue, as we examine individual investor’s trading behavior directly, as 
reflected in portfolio position changes in response to changing risk, and how culture factor plays 
a role in deterring investor’s trading behavior based on different risk levels.  
We use the Hofstede (2001) culture dimension score on individualism vs. collectivism, 
as the culture factor. The detailed score for each country can be found in Appendix 1. Based on 
Hofstede’s classification, a country with higher cultural dimension score is classified more as 
individualism culture. Individualism cultures describes societies that emphasize the moral worth 
of the individuals, the exercise of individuals’ goals, desires, freedom, independence, and self-
reliance, and advocate that interests of individuals should be priority. Considering these culture 
characteristics, we hypothesize that subjective assessments among individuals may explain the 
differential or contrasting behaviors to risk: individual investors are more likely to take the 
initiative in actively trading in response to market signals. In addition, investors may have high 
risk tolerance, or are even adventuresome so exhibit “flight to risk” preferences, in the sense 





other hand, societies with collectivist traditions emphasize cohesiveness amongst members, and 
individuals in these societies are more likely to adjust their behavior with that of their cohorts, 
rather than maximizing their own private benefits. Therefore, we propose that more collectivist 
cultures constrain the initiative for investors to actively trading in response to market signals, 
and individual investors with these cultural attributes are more likely to exhibit herding 
behavior and are less sensitive to variations in the risk environment.  
Our results support our hypothesis. We find that small investors’ responses to risk (both 
traditional and extreme risks) in those small Eurozone countries are significantly influenced by 
country culture. In other words, the culture variable affects the impact of risk on investor’s 
trading behavior. The impact of risk on fund flow is significantly positive and are larger from 
countries with more individualistic cultures.  This implies that individual investors from these 
countries are more sensitive to variations in risk, in terms of engaging in active trading in 
response to risk changes. On the other hand, when controlling for the culture variable, small 
investors trading behavior is not directly affected by risk. Our results emphasize the importance 
of cultural factors in determining individual investor’s behavior in response to risk in small 
Eurozone countries. To the best of our knowledge, our research is the first study that provides a 
detailed examination of individual investor’s trading behavior and its key determinants in 
relatively small Eurozone countries that were particularly affected by the European banking and 
European sovereign debt crisis. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes sample 
construction; Section 3 describes model specifications. The detail results are reported in Section 







2. Sample Construction  
The data of mutual fund net flows used in this study are obtained from Thomson Reuters 
DataStream and Thomson ONE. For each of the countries in this study, we choose the equity 
index with the longest history as the major stock index to use in this study. The historical prices 
for those indices are collected from Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters DataStream. Table 1 
presents the details of the indices, including the time period and the number of observations for 
each country when we use daily, weekly, and monthly data to calculate risk variables.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
The index for our sample countries start from as early as 1987, including Finland’s OMS 
Helsinki Index, Ireland’s Irish Overall Index, and Sweden’s Stockholm All-Share Index, to as 
late as 1995, including Norway’s OMX Oslo All Share Index. The index for each country 
covers more than 18 years, from as short as 225 months (19 years) to as long as 445 months (37 
years). Therefore, our sample period covers major historical events and business cycles, 
allowing for a broad perspective for investigating investors’ behavior across different market 
conditions.  
 
2.1. Traditional risk (bases on standard deviations) and extreme risk estimation 
2.1.1 Traditional risk measure 
In order to calculate both the standard and extreme risk measure, we need to calculate 
returns from index prices first. Following previous literature, we use the logarithmic percentage 





monthly basis, respectively. The summary statistics of logarithmic percentage changes for each 
country is shown in Table 2. Panel A, B, and C in Table 2 provide the statistics of returns based 
on daily, weekly, and monthly index prices, respectively. Panel D of Table 2 show the statistics 
during the crisis period of 2008-09, in addition to the whole sample period. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
As shown in table 2, Greece has the lowest average returns during over its sample period 
with -0.47% daily return, while Norway and Sweden have the highest returns during the sample 
period. For all countries, significant departures from normality are observed for all data 
frequencies, based on the Jarque-Bera statistics. At daily, weekly, and monthly frequencies, for 
all nine countries, the markets show negative skewness and leptokurtosis. Jarque-Bera test 
rejects the normality of the return distribution, implying that extreme measure of risk which 
does not assume normal distribution may be better than standard risk measure. However, in this 
study we compare and use both measures comprehensively to check investor’s response.  
We then annualize the returns to get annualized geometric returns before calculating 
traditional and extreme risks, assuming 252 effective trading days over a year. The traditional 
risk measure is calculated as the annualized geometric standard deviation of the annualized 
return of index for each country. 
 
2.1.2 Extreme risk measure 
The extreme measure of volatility is estimated as the percentage of extreme days, weeks 
or months over a given period. Most researchers define the extreme value as the lowest or the 





1996).  Jones, Walker and Wilson (2004) use the statistical distribution of annualized geometric 
return to arbitrarily assign the distribution percentiles of 5% and 95% as cutoff points to 
distinguish extreme values. In our study, we define the extreme dates as the observations that 
are less than the difference between the lower quartile (Q1) and the value of 1.5 times of the 
interquartile range (IQR, aka. the lower inner fence), or greater than the sum of the upper 
quartile (Q3) and the value of 1.5 times of the interquartile range (IQR, aka. the upper inner 
fence), following the traditional outlier classification methodology suggested by Tukey (1977): 
 
Extreme Observation < Q1 - 1.5 × IQR, or Extreme Observation > Q3 + 1.5 × IQR 
 
The range suggested by Tukey’s fence is slightly narrower than ±3σ in normally 
distributed dataset, which declares about 1% of outliers. The extreme risk for a given year is 
determined as the percentage of outliers during a given interval over that year, i.e. Percentage of 
Extremes = No. of Outliers / Annual Trading Days (Weeks or Months).  
 
2.2.   Comparison of two risk measures  
One weakness of the traditional risk measure is that it is treats positive and negative 
price changes symmetrically. However, the extreme volatility method provides both positive 
and negative measures, and can be used to more accurately predict the behavior of risk-averse 
investors who responses are more dramatic to negative changes than to the positive changes of 
equity prices.  
Figure 1 portrays the time series of the extreme measure of risk for Belgium, Greece, 





days were characterized by extreme volatility in 2008; Belgian and Portuguese markets 
experienced extreme volatility on more than 25% of their trading days in the same year, 
reflecting the strong and persistent influence of the Global financial crisis in 2008-2009. Greece 
has 16% of extreme days in 2015, somewhat higher than its experience in 2008, when 13% of 
annual trading days are identified as extreme. In sum, the countries of this sample display some 
commonalities as well as differences in regards to the timing and magnitude of their exposure to 
extreme volatility over the sample period. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
In Tables 3 to 5, we compare the traditional risk and extreme risk as measured by the 
percentage of extreme days, weeks, or months by each country, respectively. As table 3 shows, 
estimated from daily data, volatility rankings of conventional risk measure are similar to those 
of extreme measures. In particular, the most volatile year and top ranked extreme years for each 
country are almost identical for all the nine countries.  
 
[Insert Tables 3 here] 
Using weekly data to measure risk, as shown in table 4, both methodologies almost 
cohere as well. In most countries, the most volatile 2 or 3 years are identical across risk 
measures. However, Greece and Sweden are exceptional cases. Traditional risk measure shows 
1998, 2015, and 2014 as the most volatile years, while extreme measure suggests 2009, 1999, 
and 2011 in Greece. For Sweden, extreme measure approach indicates 2001, 2000, and 2002 are 
the most volatile years, whereas standard deviation catches 2008, 1998, and 2000 as the most 






[Insert Table 4 here] 
Using monthly data, we observe that in the majority of cases, the most volatile years 
based on extreme measure rankings also shown to be the most volatile based on traditional 
standard deviation analysis ranking. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
According to Switzer et al (2017), for G-7 countries of their study, volatility as captured 
by the extreme measure shows similar patterns as the traditional volatility measure for most 
years. Many commonalities in the attribution of high risk by both measures are observed, 
consistent with Longin and Solnik (2001). However, differences are also observed, therefore, in 
our formal test, we use both risk measures in our analyses of investor behavior. 
 
3. Results based on individual countries  
In this research, our objective is to explain investor’s reaction to both risk variables by 
measuring net flows to equity mutual funds against changes in both extreme volatility and 
standard deviation changes. In our initial specifications, our dependent variables is the net flow 
to equity mutual funds, with the risk measures lagged by one period in separate specifications. 
Our control variables include returns (GeoMean), linear time trend (Time) to account for 
possible secular growth in such funds, as well as a financial market crisis dummy variable 
(Crisis) in our following models. 
 
NetFlows(t) = α + βGeoMean(t-1) + γGeoStdDev(t-1) + δTime +λCrisis+ ε(t)             Model 1 






NetFlows(t) = α + βGeoMean(t-1) + γNegExtr(t-1) + ζPosExtr(t-1) + δ Time + λCrisis +ε(t)        Model 
3 
 
The variable NetFlow refers to the net flows to equity mutual funds, which are defined 
as new sales plus reinvestment of income less withdrawals and transfers; TotalExtr denotes the 
percentage of the number of extreme days over the measure horizon; NegExtr and PosExtr 
represent the percentages of number of negative and positive extreme days over the measure 
horizon, respectively; Crisis is a dummy variable to indicate the global financial crisis in 2008-
9. We expect that regression coefficients for mean returns are positive, and for market volatility 
are negative, using the traditional or extreme day risk measures. In addition, when volatility is 
divided into negative and positive components, the coefficient for the negative extreme days 
should be negative since when stock market is negatively volatile, loss averse investors tend to 
hold less equity, and the coefficient for the positive extreme days probably positive.  
In order to anticipate the effect of the crisis variable, we compare summary statistics 
during the financial crisis and the full sample period, based on Panel D of Table 2. In most 
countries, the average monthly logarithmic percentage changes are negative, ranging between -
4.53 to -8.86 percent in 2008, and between -0.08 to 1.00 percent across the whole sample 
period. The standard deviations also increase, during the financial crisis years, while Kurtosis 
decreases in both 2008 and 2009. To prevent possible “overfitting” using the crisis dummy 
variable, we also estimate our above three models with crisis dummy variable excluded.  
In Table 6, we provide the regression results for the nine countries. Panel A (B) shows 






[Insert Table 6 here] 
There is no major difference in the results between Models 1-3 and Models 4-6, except 
for the case of Belgium. The regression data shows significant statistic values for the traditional 
measure of the risk in Austria’s case. Austrian retail investors also respond to extreme risk 
measures, according to the result of Model 2. Furthermore, they move into markets subsequent 
to negative extreme event. It is interesting to observe Austria’s case since the country is 
classified as a relatively less individualistic culture according to Hofstede (2001). The only 
other country in which investors respond to risk/extreme risk is Belgium, which is one of central 
figures of the European banking crisis, suffering from the default of its two largest banks. As 
shown in Model 3, small investors in Belgium exhibit “flight to risk” behavior with increased 
negative extreme measures, while there was fund outflow when there are positive extreme 
outliers. This gives us a scenario that Belgian investors are attracted to negative extreme events 
(buying the dips) and exit the markets on positive extreme events (sell at the high). However, 
when we run regression without financial crisis dummy variable, such behavior is no longer 
observable in Models 4, 5 and 6.  
For both Portugal and Ireland, the crisis dummy variable plays significant role, though 
in different directions. With the crisis dummy included, funds flow out of the Portuguese market 
while the opposite happens in Ireland. Hofstede’s individualism vs. collectivism score classifies 
Portugal as a highly collectivist and Ireland as a highly individualistic culture. Indeed, investors 
in highly individualistic cultures such as Ireland show high risk tolerance or even risk loving 
proclivities.  Hence, during the crisis period, they are more inclined to exhibit “flight to risk” 
behavior. However, as we see from the separate country results, the impacts of risks on fund 





example, at the same level of individualism score, countries such as Sweden and Norway do not 
show consistent result. Mutual fund flows of Greece, Norway, and Sweden are not significantly 
responsive to changes in with any of the variables in the models. Norway and Sweden show 
high levels of the individualism index. So far, the influence of culture on investor 
responsiveness to risk is not clearcut. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
These results are also depicted in Figure 2, where the relationship between investors’ 
behavior vs. extreme risk is shown for Belgium, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. Figure 2.1 
graphs the case of Belgium, which is classified as an individualistic. The investors’ tendency of 
“flight to risk” is evident in the graph, as it is observed that the increased risk of the equity 
market has the negative relationship with the equity market’s mutual fund inflow, especially in 
2002, 2005, and 2008. In collectivist cultures, the relation between risk and fund flow is mixed. 
For example, Figure 2.2 shows that in Greece, the equity market volatility moves in the same 
trend with the equity market’s mutual fund inflow. However, for another collectivist culture 
country, Portugal, the relation between risk and fund flow is negative, as shown in Figure 2.4. 
For Ireland, the mutual fund flow is not responsive to changes in equity market volatility. 
Therefore, we cannot conclude decisively that the cultural variable has monotonic impact on the 
relation between fund flow and extreme risk. 
The drawback of the regression based on individual countries is that we cannot 
incorporate the culture variable directly in the regression, since it is a highly persistent/time-
invariant. As a consequence, in order to clearly understand the impact of culture in the relation 





regressions including all the nine countries with culture dummy variable added.  
 
4. Country culture and panel regressions  
One important research focus of this study is on the effects of cultural factors on small 
investors’ behavior in response to both traditional and extreme risks. In order to examine the 
influence of individualism or collectivism in the market, we import Hofstede’s cultural 
dimension score. As discussed in the previous section, according to the results of individual 
country analyses, investors’ reaction against risks by country are non-monotonic, considering 
the cultural dimension score. This may due to the fact the impact of cultural factors on the 
relation between investors’ response to risk factors are regime dependent, or there is a threshold 
level of culture score that affect such impact. Thus, in order to obtain distinct and intuitive 
outcomes, we separate the nine Eurozone countries into two groups: countries with 
individualistic cultures vs. countries with collectivist cultures, based on the median of 
Hofstede’s cultural dimension score. Countries with Hofstede’s score above the median are 
classified as individualistic, and we use a dummy variable, Individualism =1 to indicate this 
group. For our sample countries, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Ireland and Norway are members 
of this group.  On the other hand, Finland, Austria, Greece, and Portugal are classified as 
collectivist societies (Individualism =0). 
With this country classification, we perform panel regressions using the country 
specific, time invariant cultural variables, and consider the interaction between the culture 
variable and the risk variable to determine how culture moderates the impact of risk on 
investor’s trading behavior. The maintained hypothesis of delayed responses of investors is 





for each country, we also add GDP per capita (GDP) to the analysis. The specific models 
follow:  
 
NetFlows(t) = α + β1GeoMean(t-1)+β3Individualism+β11GDP(t-1 )+ β12Crisis+ ε(t)                 1’ 
 
NetFlows(t) = α + β1GeoMean(t-1)+β2GeoStdDev(t-1)+β3Individualism +β11GDP(t-1) + β12Crisis + ε(t)   
2’ 
 
NetFlows(t) = α + β1GeoMean(t-1)+β2GeoStdDev(t-1)+β4Individualism*GeoStdDev(t-1)+β11GDP(t-1) 
+β12Crisis+ε(t)                 3’ 
 
NetFlows(t) = α + β1GeoMean(t-1)+β5TotalExtr(t-1) + β11GDP(t-1)+β12Crisis+ε(t)                  4’ 
 
NetFlows(t) = α + β1GeoMean(t-1)+ β3Individualism + β5TotalExtr(t-1) + β11GDP(t-1)+β12Crisis+ε(t)       
5’ 
 
NetFlows(t) = α + β1GeoMean(t-1) +β5TotalExtr(t-1)+ β6Individualism*TotalExtr(t-1)+β11GDP(t-1) 
+β12Crisis+ ε(t)                 6’ 
 
NetFlows(t) = α + β1GeoMean(t-1) + β7NegExtr(t-1) +β8PosExtr(t-1)+ β11GDP(t-1)+β12Crisis+ ε(t)      7’ 
 
NetFlows(t) = α + β1GeoMean(t-1) + β3Individualism + β7NegExtr(t-1) +β8PosExtr(t-1)+ β11GDP(t-1) 
+β12Crisis+ ε(t)                 8’ 
 
NetFlows(t) = α + β1GeoMean(t-1) +β7 NegExtr(t-1)+β8 PosExtr(t-1)+ β9Individualism*NegExtr(t-1)+ 
β10Individualism*PosExtr(t-1)+β11GDP(t-1)+β12Crisis+ ε(t)                 9’ 
 
In the regression models, Individualism is the cultural dummy variable. GDP represents 
for GDP per capita of each country at specific time point t. The definitions of the other variables 
are identical to the regression models in section 3. We also implement panel regressions that 
incorporate controls for year fixed effects. Table 7 below reports the results. Panel A provides 
results for models 1’to 9’ without country fixed effects and Panel B reports results that include 
country fixed effects in the analyses. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
We observe positive coefficients for the interaction variables Individualism*Geo StdDev 





However, it is interesting to note that neither the traditional risk nor the extreme risk measure 
affects fund flow directly, as shown by the insignificant coefficient of Geo.Std.Deviation(t-1) 
and coefficient of Total Extreme Value (t-1) in models 1’, 2’, 4’ and 5’ for both panels. We note 
that the culture-risk interaction variables show a significantly positive impact on fund flow (e.g., 
0.163 in model 3’ and 0.112 in model 6’) at the 1% significant level. This finding can explain 
why our previous tests in section 3, based on risk variables only, does not systematically predict 
investors trading behavior. Further looking at the sign of the interaction terms in models 3’ and 
6’ in both panels, in contrast to investors from collectivist cultures, investors based in 
individualistic cultures are more responsive to changes in both traditional and extreme risk. In 
addition, the positive sign of the interaction terms shows that investors from individualistic 
societies exhibit “flight to risk” behavior, performing like risk seekers with high risk tolerance. 
We use country size, as measured by GDP per capita as a control variable in the regressions. 
However, it is not found to be a significant determinant of investors’ trading behavior. 
Another noteworthy point is that when we further look at whether the positive extreme 
shock and negative extreme shock have different impact on investor’s response to risk, we find 
out that investors are actually indifferent in this regard. For example, for each of the negative 
and positive extreme risk variables, the coefficients are not significant, shown in the results for 
models 7’ and 8’.  Similar results are also shown with the interaction terms (models 3’, 6’, and 
9’).  
As a robustness check, we also separate sample countries into three groups based on 
Hofstede’s culture score, with individualism in the top tercile group, neutral in the middle 
tercile group and collectivism in the bottom tercile group.
1
 Our results based on this alternative 
                                                             
1 Full sample results provide qualitatively and quantitatively similar findings, are available on request, and are 





classification are qualitatively and quantitatively consistent with the previous findings: the 
culture-risk interaction term has a significantly positive impact on fund flows. In addition, small 
investors with individualism (or neutral) cultural backgrounds exhibit flight to risk behavior. 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
We also conduct a further robustness check using simultaneous equations to account for 
the possibility that both risk and fund flows are determined simultaneously. Table 8 present the 
results of the simultaneous regression analyses using 2SLS. The results are consistent with our 
previous findings that there is a significant positive impact of the traditional risk-individualism 
interaction term on fund flow, as shown in model 3’ that the coefficient of Individualism*Geo 
StdDev is 0.143 with 95% level. When we use extreme risk measure, the results are similar: the 
coefficient of Individualism*Total Extr in model 6’ is 0.101 with 5% level. Therefore, our 
results are robust to alternative classification of the culture dummy variable as well as 
simultaneous model specification. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study focuses on nine small European countries over a long-time frame and show 
that two different risk measures, i.e. the traditional risk measure and the extreme risk measure, 
capture different responses from investors in those countries. More importantly, we find that a 
country culture factor plays a critical role in explaining small stockholders’ behavior, and in 
particular the trading responses of such investors to changes in the risk environment. In country 
specific regressions, with the exception of Austria, small investors domiciled in collectivist 





that collectivism constrains the initiative for investors to actively trade in response to market 
signals. In a pooled panel regression where we can control for the highly persistent and time 
invariant country variable, we find that the culture-risk interaction variable has a significantly 
positive impact on fund flows. In addition, small investors from individualistic societies exhibit 




Bank for International Settlements. 2011. Interpretive issues with respect to the revisions to the 
market risk framework. Basel, Switzerland. 
 
Barber, B. M., Odean, T., and Zheng L., 2005. Out of sight, out of mind: the effects of expenses 
on mutual fund flows. Journal of Business 78, 2095-2119. 
 
Barberis, N., Schleifer, A., and Vishny, R., 1998. A model of investor sentiment. Journal of 
Financial Economics 49, 307-343. 
 
Benartzi, S. and Thaler R.H., 1995. Myopic loss aversion and the equity premium puzzle. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 73-92. 
 
Burnie, D.A., and De Ritter, A., 2009.  Far tail or extreme day returns, mutual fund cash flows 
and investment behaviour. Gotland University. Working paper. 
 
Cashman, G. D., Deli, D. N., Nardari, F., and Villupuram, S. V., 2014. Investor behavior in the 
mutual fund industry: evidence from gross flows. Journal of Economics and Finance 38, 541-
567. 
 
Chang, C., and Lin, S., 2015. The effects of national culture and behavioral pitfalls on investors’ 
decision-making: herding behavior in international stock markets. International Review of 
Economics and Finance 37, 380-392. 
 
Chui, A.C., Titman, S., and Wei, K.C., 2010. Individualism and momentum around the world. 






Clifford, C.P., Fulkerson, J.A., Jordan, B.D., and Waldman, S., 2013. Risk and fund flows. 
University of Kentucky. Working paper. 
 
Dimson, E., Marsh, P., and Staunton, M., 2002. Triumph of the optimists: 101 years of global 
investment returns. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
DiTraglia, F. J., and Gerlach, J. R., 2012. Portfolio Selection: an extreme value approach. 
University of Pennsylvania. Working paper. 
 
Eun, C. S., Wang, L., and Xiao, S.C., 2015. Culture and R
2
. Journal of Financial Economics 115, 
283-303. 
 
Frazzini, A. and Lamont, O. A., 2008. Dumb money: mutual fund flows and the cross-section of 
stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics 88, 299-322. 
 
Gelfand, M., Raver, J., Nishii, L., Leslie, L., Lun, J., et al.  2011. Differences between tight and 
loose societies. Science 33, 1100-1104.  
 
Girard E, and Biswas, R., 2007. Trading volume and market volatility: developed versus 
emerging stock markets. Financial Review 42, 429-459. 
 
Grinblatt, M., and Kelaoharju, M., 2001, How distance, language, and culture influence 
stockholdings and trades. Journal of Finance 56, 1053-1071. 
 
Hofstede, G., 2001. Culture’s consequences: comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and 
organizations across nations, Second edition. Beverly-Hills, CA: Sage Publication. 
 
Hyung, N., and De Vries, C., 2005. Portfolio diversification effects of downside risk. Journal 
of Financial Econometrics 3, 107-125. 
 
Hyung, N., and De Vries, C., 2007. Portfolio selection with heavy tails. Journal of Empirical 
Finance 14 (3), 383-400. 
 
Ivkovic, Z., and Weisbenner, S., 2009. Individual investor mutual fund flows. Journal of 






Jones, C. P., Walker, M. D., and Wilson, J. W., 2004. Analyzing stock market volatility using 
extreme-day measures. Journal of Financial Research 27, 585-601 
 
Jones, C. P. and Wilson, J.W., 1989. Is stock price volatility increasing? Financial 
Analysts Journal 45, 20-26 
 
Kim, M. S., 2017. Changes in mutual fund flows and managerial incentives. University of New 
South Wales. Working paper. 
 
Longin, F. M., 1996. The asymptotic distribution of extreme stock returns. Journal of 
Business 69, 383-408. 
 
Longin, F. M., and Solnik. B., 1981. Extreme correlation of international equity markets. Journal 
of Finance 56, 649-676.  
 
Longin, F. M., 2005. The choice of the distribution of asset returns: how extreme value 
theory can help? Journal of Banking and Finance 29 (4), 1017-1035. 
 
O’Neal, E. S., 2004. Purchase and redemption patterns of U.S. equity mutual funds, Financial 
Management 33, 63-90. 
 
Schmeling, M., 2009. Investor sentiment and stock returns: some international evidence. Journal 
of Empirical Finance 16 (3), 394-408. 
 
Schwert, G. W., 1990. Indexes of U.S. stock prices from 1802 to 1987. Journal of 
Business 63, 399-427. 
 
Sirri, E. R., and Tufano, P., 1998. Costly search and mutual fund flows. Journal of Finance 53, 
1589-1622. 
 
Spiegel, M., and Zhang, H., 2013. Mutual fund risk and market share-adjust fund flows. Journal 
of Financial Economics 108, 506–528. 
 
Statman, M., 2008. Countries and culture in behavioral finance. CFA Institute, 38-44. 
 
Switzer, L. N., Wang, J., and Lee, S., 2017. Extreme risk and small investor behavior in 











Figure 1. Extreme Risk Measure (in %) for Belgium, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal during 1983-
2016 
 
Figure 1.1. Extreme Risk Measure (in %) for Belgium, 1988-2016 
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Figure 1.3. Extreme Risk Measure (in %) for Ireland, 1987-2016 
 
 
Figure 1.4. Extreme Risk Measure (in %) for Portugal, 1988-2016 
 
Figure 2.1. Net Flows (annual) into Equity Mutual Funds for Belgium (in USD $100 Million) vs. 











































































































































































































































































Figure 2.2. Net Flows (annual) into Equity Mutual Funds for Belgium (in USD $100 Million) vs. 
Extreme Risk Measure (in %) in Greece, 1995-2013 
 
Figure 2.3. Net Flows (annual) into Equity Mutual Funds for Belgium (in USD $100 Million) vs. 
Extreme Risk Measure (in %) in Ireland, 2002-2012  
 
 
Figure 2.4.  
Net Flows (annual) into Equity Mutual Funds for Belgium (in USD $100 Million) vs. Extreme 





























Table 1 Statistics of indices        
 
We focus on nine relatively small Eurozone countries in this study: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden 
that were epicenters of European banking crisis, and the European sovereign debt crisis. For each country, we choose the equity index with the longest 
history as the major stock index to use in this study. The historical prices for those indices are collected from Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters 
DataStream. This table presents the details of _the nine indices, including time period and the number of observations for each country when we use 
daily, weekly, and monthly data to calculate risk variables. 
 
No. Country Index 
Daily Data 
 Weekly Data 
 
Monthly Data 
Time Period Obs. 
 
Time Period Obs. 
 
Time Period  Obs. 
1 Austria Austrian Traded Index (ATX) 
June 5, 1992 - 
March 24, 2017 
6150 
 
June 5, 1992 - 
March 24, 2017 
1295 
 
June 30, 1992 - 
February 28, 2017 
297 
2 Belgium Belgium All Share Index (BELAS) 
October 3, 1988 - 
March 24, 2017 
7162 
 
October 7, 1988 - 
March 24, 2017 
1486 
 
October 7, 1988 - 
February 28, 2017 
341 
3 Denmark OMX Copenhagen 20 Index (KFX) 
December 4, 1989 - 
March 24, 2017 
6837 
 
December 8, 1989 - 
March 24, 2017 
1425 
 
December 29, 1989 - 
February 28, 2017 
327 
4 Finland OMS Helsinki Index (HEX) 
January 30, 1987 - 
February 28, 2017 
7549 
 
January 30, 1987 - 
February 24, 2017 
1570 
 
January 30, 1987 - 
January 31, 2017 
361 
5 Greece Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) Index 
Jun 30, 1992 - 
February 28, 2017 
6140 
 
July 3, 1992 - 
February 24, 2017 
1282 
 
July 31, 1992 - 
January 31, 2017 
294 
6 Ireland Irish Overall Index (ISEQ) 
January 2, 1987 - 
March 24, 2017 
7609 
 
February 4, 1983 - 
February 24, 2017 
1786 
 
January 31, 1983 - 
February 28, 2017 
410 
7 Norway OMX Oslo All Share Index (OSEAX) 
December 29, 1995 
- March 24, 2017 
5331 
 
December 29, 1995 
- March 24, 2017 
1109 
 
December 29, 1995 - 
February 28, 2017 
255 
8 Portugal Portugal All Share Index (PSI) 
January 5, 1988 - 
March 24, 2017 
7154 
 
January 9, 1988 - 
March 24, 2017 
1520 
 
January 29, 1988 - 
February 28, 2017 
350 
 9 Sweden Stockholm All-Share Index (SAX) 
January 2, 1987 - 
February 28, 2017 
7573 
 
January 2, 1987 - 
February 28, 2017 
1574 
 
January 31, 1980 - 







Table 2. Summary statistics of daily/weekly/monthly logarithmatic percent changes (i.e. returns) of indices  
             




1% 5% 10% 90% 95% 99% 
Panel A. Daily Data 
Austria 0.0168 0.0600 1.3605 -0.3699 7.0939 13033.5632 -4.1698 -2.1652 -1.4002 1.4208 1.9056 3.4388 
Belgium 0.0296 0.0599 1.0437 -0.1100 7.6207 17342.4548 -2.9831 -1.6847 -1.0868 1.0716 1.5673 2.7324 
Denmark 0.0312 0.0596 1.1896 -0.2878 5.4294 8490.7097 -3.3404 -1.8812 -1.2997 1.3315 1.8244 3.0799 
Finland 0.0283 0.0560 1.6216 -0.2981 7.6116 18332.9331 -4.6496 -2.5136 -1.6873 1.6915 2.4616 4.5382 
Greece -0.0047 0.0115 1.8742 -0.2601 5.6020 8096.5801 -5.4298 -2.9842 -2.0064 2.0397 2.8572 5.1334 
Ireland 0.0238 0.0495 1.2607 -0.8218 10.5498 36138.0111 -3.8700 -1.8522 -1.2400 1.3019 1.7842 3.3301 
Norway 0.0381 0.1043 1.3554 -0.5958 6.0898 8551.5429 -4.1378 -2.1205 -1.4159 1.4479 2.0026 3.3202 
Portugal 0.0131 0.0140 1.0759 -0.3667 9.7827 28683.4787 -3.1829 -1.6620 -1.0920 1.1272 1.6241 2.8246 
Sweden 0.0342 0.0801 1.3225 -0.1239 5.3008 8884.3645 -3.8125 -2.0677 -1.4092 1.4066 1.9700 3.5672 






         
Panel B. Weekly Data 
Austria 0.0801 0.2580 3.0910 -1.4792 14.4433 11719.3723 -8.2113 -4.5514 -3.4394 3.2815 4.3767 6.7723 
Belgium 0.1420 0.3113 2.3731 -1.4583 14.9052 14272.7576 -6.7343 -3.9823 -2.4188 2.6087 3.4002 5.7797 
Denmark 0.1512 0.3175 2.6330 -0.9537 6.6591 2846.9231 -7.0802 -4.1158 -2.8720 3.0625 3.8407 5.8779 
Finland 0.1362 0.2652 3.5620 -0.5548 3.6421 947.6775 -10.1309 -5.5977 -4.0108 4.0295 5.6184 8.7303 
Greece -0.0185 0.0574 4.2358 -0.1996 3.3167 595.6637 -12.0981 -6.9053 -4.8627 4.6592 6.1885 10.9949 
Ireland 0.1702 0.3937 2.8646 -1.5298 12.7169 12724.0204 -8.5059 -4.1356 -2.8895 3.2471 4.2346 6.6763 
Norway 0.1834 0.5046 2.9096 -1.1327 7.3826 2753.1451 -8.3526 -4.8245 -2.9110 3.0252 3.8062 6.8770 
Portugal 0.0528 0.1028 2.5132 -0.7780 6.2558 2630.1025 -8.2099 -3.7179 -2.7498 2.7429 3.9139 6.5868 
Sweden 0.1646 0.4128 2.8486 -0.6693 5.4360 2054.1876 -7.6722 -4.5096 -3.1517 3.1939 4.2327 7.1231 







Panel D. Whole sample period vs. crisis period. 
   




1% 5% 10% 90% 95% 99% 
Austria 
Jun 1992 - 
Feb 2017 296 0.3615 1.0892 6.1555 -1.1407 3.7602 238.5806 -18.5845 -10.1973 -6.9855 7.5428 8.8351 12.4084 
2009 12 2.9535 3.3022 8.5102 -0.8379 0.7025 1.6508 -14.7698 -10.4303 -5.4879 12.0763 12.8230 13.4021 
2008 12 -7.8906 -5.1448 12.6039 -0.6202 0.3061 0.8161 -31.9413 -29.3298 -25.6027 2.7774 7.2486 11.4020 
Belgium 
Oct 1988 - 
Feb 2017 340 0.6137 1.0386 4.6288 -1.0080 2.4974 145.9397 -14.5691 -8.1971 -4.6983 5.3307 6.7679 9.5863 
2009 12 2.0548 3.2581 6.0660 -0.4587 -0.3349 0.4768 -9.1809 -6.9306 -4.5274 9.2403 10.0677 10.5426 
2008 12 -5.3790 -3.6539 9.0788 -0.2209 -1.2006 0.8183 -20.1941 -17.5311 -14.7823 5.2510 6.3431 7.1137 
Denmark 
Dec 1989 - 
Feb 2017 326 0.6637 0.9758 5.3089 -0.5545 1.3498 41.4537 -14.8811 -8.1400 -6.0569 6.9451 8.2421 11.6878 
2009 12 2.5572 1.8970 7.0328 0.7288 1.3946 2.0348 -7.8010 -6.7073 -5.3600 7.3126 12.3817 17.2850 






         
Panel C. Monthly Data 
Austria 0.3615 1.0892 6.1555 -1.1407 3.7602 238.5806 -18.5845 -10.1973 -6.9855 7.5428 8.8351 12.4084 
Belgium 0.6137 1.0386 4.6288 -1.0080 2.4974 145.9397 -14.5691 -8.1971 -4.6983 5.3307 6.7679 9.5863 
Denmark 0.6637 0.9758 5.3089 -0.5545 1.3498 41.4537 -14.8811 -8.1400 -6.0569 6.9451 8.2421 11.6878 
Finland 0.5861 0.6732 7.4341 -0.2154 1.6876 45.5041 -19.1259 -11.3699 -8.3427 8.8410 11.4745 20.3757 
Greece -0.0887 0.4265 9.0829 -0.2345 1.3781 25.8701 -25.3191 -15.4895 -11.8359 10.4745 14.0990 20.0462 
Ireland 0.7458 1.3983 6.0320 -1.0131 3.2589 250.9545 -17.6699 -9.1039 -6.3349 7.1754 9.5612 12.6107 
Norway 0.8019 1.3902 5.9166 -1.3484 4.4471 286.2679 -22.8869 -8.3305 -5.5780 7.3036 8.8279 11.1287 
Portugal 0.2573 0.3602 5.4960 -0.4136 2.3449 89.9131 -16.1342 -8.3648 -5.9919 6.6518 8.8381 14.5988 






Jan 1987 - 
Jan 2017 360 0.5861 0.6732 7.4341 -0.2154 1.6876 45.5041 -19.1259 -11.3699 -8.3427 8.8410 11.4745 20.3757 
2009 12 1.4832 2.5201 8.6403 0.1700 1.4814 1.1552 -14.0734 -10.4541 -6.6444 7.7624 13.2955 18.4713 
2008 12 -6.3652 -6.1905 6.8957 -0.6141 -0.4420 0.8520 -19.5638 -16.3998 -13.0412 0.5285 0.8950 1.2246 
Greece 
Jul 1992 - 
Jan 2017 293 -0.0887 0.4265 9.0829 -0.2345 1.3781 25.8701 -25.3191 -15.4895 -11.8359 10.4745 14.0990 20.0462 
2009 12 1.7204 2.6189 10.7347 -0.3204 -0.1370 0.2147 -16.8673 -15.8082 -13.7705 12.1840 15.8038 19.0224 
2008 12 -8.8693 -6.1391 10.3716 -1.0793 1.3006 3.1757 -31.2140 -25.3777 -19.1827 -0.9396 2.0115 4.8559 
Ireland 
Jan 1983 - 
Feb 2017 409 0.7458 1.3983 6.0320 -1.0131 3.2589 250.9545 -17.6699 -9.1039 -6.3349 7.1754 9.5612 12.6107 
2009 12 1.9889 3.4268 9.0016 -0.4051 0.5340 0.4708 -14.9858 -12.9271 -9.9477 10.1154 13.7264 17.0055 
2008 12 -9.0412 -5.9859 8.7199 -0.1941 -1.2916 0.9095 -22.9332 -20.3369 -17.6670 1.9485 2.6709 2.7593 
Norway 
Dec 1995 
- Feb 2017 254 0.8019 1.3902 5.9166 -1.3484 4.4471 286.2679 -22.8869 -8.3305 -5.5780 7.3036 8.8279 11.1287 
2009 12 3.6776 4.0228 5.2600 0.1802 0.6893 0.3025 -5.3866 -4.1903 -2.5998 9.6991 11.8826 13.5900 
2008 12 -6.2202 -5.2617 12.8421 -0.4010 -0.9388 0.7624 -27.0131 -25.6363 -23.9752 7.6412 9.4098 11.0751 
Portugal 
Jan 1988 - 
Feb 2017 349 0.2573 0.3602 5.4960 -0.4136 2.3449 89.9131 -16.1342 -8.3648 -5.9919 6.6518 8.8381 14.5988 
2009 12 2.8017 2.6839 4.9600 -0.0534 -0.6464 0.2146 -5.5719 -3.9126 -2.1452 8.1656 9.3783 10.5464 
2008 12 -5.7293 -2.5220 8.6310 -0.8762 0.0096 1.5356 -22.6329 -19.3963 -16.0307 2.2100 3.8644 5.2217 
Sweden 
Jan 1980 - 
Jan 2017 444 1.0082 1.2433 5.9358 -0.4064 2.0092 86.9052 -15.3517 -9.3336 -6.1547 7.7278 10.2612 14.0407 
2009 12 3.1910 1.9663 5.6680 1.2865 3.1955 8.4160 -5.3646 -2.7040 0.0672 9.1543 13.0364 16.3422 





Table 3. The top 15 year rankings of volatility as measured by standard deviation and 



















1 2008 47.9863  2008 28.4000  2008 35.7265  2008 35.7265 1 
2 2009 35.7144  2009 24.1935  2002 25.6784  2002 25.6784 2 
3 2011 29.1925  2011 13.3065  2009 22.5379  2009 22.5379 3 
4 1998 24.3126  1992 8.4507  2011 21.2453  2011 21.2453 4 
5 2010 23.8813  2012 7.6923  2015 20.5910  2015 20.5910 5 
6 2016 21.8380  1998 7.6613  2003 19.8203  2003 19.8203 6 
7 2012 21.7115  2010 7.6305  2010 19.5069  2010 19.5069 7 
8 2006 20.5959  2016 5.622  2016 18.9441  2016 18.9441 8 
9 2007 20.2668  1997 5.2632  1998 18.6076  1998 18.6076 9 
10 1997 20.1104  2007 4.4534  1999 16.0590  1999 16.0590 10 
11 2015 20.0032  2015 4.0323  2014 15.8120  2014 15.8120 11 
12 1992 18.5516  2006 3.6585  2000 15.6013  2000 15.6013 12 
13 2014 16.8607  2000 3.2520  2007 15.2289  2007 15.2289 13 
14 1993 16.6748  1993 3.2129  2001 14.7436  2001 14.7436 14 



















1 2008 38.4943  2008 23.2000  2000 54.7089  2000 35.4582 1 
2 2009 26.6886  2009 12.4498  2001 51.0954  2001 33.3333 2 
3 2002 24.4199  2002 10.0402  2002 39.1523  2002 24.8996 3 
4 1998 23.3034  1998 9.6000  2008 37.5657  2008 15.4150 4 
5 2016 22.0259  2001 8.8353  1998 33.0828  1999 13.5458 5 
6 2000 21.8666  2011 8.3333  1999 31.0529  1998 12.8000 6 
7 2011 21.2402  2016 7.5397  2009 29.9125  2011 12.6482 7 
8 2015 20.4903  2000 7.1713  2011 28.2242  2009 12.3506 8 
9 2001 19.9714  2015 6.0241  2003 27.8146  2003 9.2000 9 
10 2010 19.8851  1992 5.6000  1997 23.4500  1992 4.3825 10 
11 2003 17.9649  2010 5.5777  1995 22.5236  1997 4.0161 11 
12 2007 17.6929  2007 4.8193  1992 22.0537  2007 3.2000 12 
13 1992 17.4694  2003 4.0161  2012 20.8853  2006 3.1873 13 
14 2012 16.0330  2006 3.9683  1993 20.3695  2012 2.8000 14 

























1 2015 46.4653  2015 16.1435  2008 47.8976  2008 35.8268 1 
2 2012 39.9886  2012 15.6627  2009 32.6774  2009 23.7154 2 
3 2008 38.8718  1998 13.9442  1987 30.7513  2007 11.4173 3 
4 1998 38.4077  1999 13.6000  2010 25.2077  2010 11.0236 4 
5 1999 37.6695  2008 12.9555  2007 23.2181  2011 10.6719 5 
6 2011 37.0962  2011 11.5538  2011 22.8458  1987 10.3586 6 
7 2014 34.6443  2010 9.1270  2016 22.7368  2002 10.2767 7 
8 2010 34.1359  2009 8.4677  1998 22.5521  1998 10.0000 8 
9 2009 33.2648  2013 8.1301  2002 22.0552  2001 7.1146 9 
10 2000 32.4245  2014 7.2581  2001 19.4826  2016 6.2992 10 
11 2016 32.0999  2000 6.7460  2015 18.8086  2000 5.2209 11 
12 1997 31.0177  2016 6.4257  2000 17.6076  2015 5.1181 12 
13 2013 30.4778  2001 5.6000  1990 16.7002  1990 4.3825 13 
14 2001 28.6758  1997 5.0980  1999 16.4688  1988 3.9841 14 



















1 2008 46.8717  2008 24.2063%  2008 32.8977  2008 25.3906% 1 
2 2009 31.7568  2009 17.5299%  1998 26.4106  1998 21.8623% 2 
3 1998 25.2844  2011 9.0909%  2010 22.3970  2011 18.2879% 3 
4 2011 24.6472  1998 8.3665%  2011 22.0392  2015 16.7969% 4 
5 2006 24.0700  2006 6.7729%  2015 22.0009  2014 14.9020% 5 
6 2010 21.1818  2002 6.0241%  2014 20.0170  2010 13.9535% 6 
7 2002 20.7336  2016 5.5336%  2000 19.3877  2000 13.9344% 7 
8 2016 20.3397  2010 5.1587%  2016 19.3550  2016 12.4514% 8 
9 2007 19.7297  2000 4.7809%  1989 18.0892  1988 12.1827% 9 
10 2000 19.3475  2001 3.6290%  1988 17.9535  2009 9.7656% 10 
11 2001 19.1654  2005 3.5573%  2009 17.5111  2012 8.9844% 11 
12 2015 17.6858  2014 3.2000%  2012 17.2451  2013 8.6275% 12 
13 2005 17.5407  2007 3.2000%  2001 16.9526  2001 8.0972% 13 
14 2012 16.5922  2012 3.1873%  2013 16.8674  1999 7.6613% 14 

















1 2008 37.9923  2008 21.0317% 
2 2001 29.9827  2000 15.9363% 
3 2002 29.2078  2002 14.0000% 
4 2000 28.5168  2001 12.8000% 
5 1987 28.2888  2009 11.5538% 
6 2009 27.2778  2011 10.6719% 
7 2011 26.9015  1998 10.0000% 
8 1998 26.7977  1987 8.0000% 
9 1992 23.7326  1992 7.1713% 
10 2007 19.4590  2007 5.2000% 
11 1990 19.3971  1990 4.8000% 
12 2003 19.2338  2003 4.4177% 
13 2016 19.2001  2006 4.3825% 
14 1997 19.1660  1997 4.0161% 






Table 4. The top 15 year rankings of volatility as measured by standard deviation and 



















1 2008 51.7178  2008 59.6154  2008 37.2575  2008 63.4615 1 
2 2009 36.6474  2009 57.6923  2009 24.4423  2011 53.8462 2 
3 2011 29.6846  1992 48.2759  2011 22.1039  2009 51.9231 3 
4 2010 25.6182  2010 45.2830  2001 21.4142  1997 50.0000 4 
5 1998 23.8982  1998 44.2308  1998 21.3581  2002 46.1538 5 
6 1992 23.2436  2011 38.4615  2002 20.7649  1999 45.2830 6 
7 2006 21.5954  2014 36.5385  2003 19.4470  1998 44.2308 7 
8 2012 19.5731  2012 34.6154  2015 17.9414  2015 42.3077 8 
9 2016 19.5607  1997 34.6154  2010 17.8058  2010 41.5094 9 
10 2007 19.4641  2015 32.6923  1990 17.6666  2014 36.5385 10 
11 1999 19.4486  1999 32.0755  1999 17.5854  2013 36.5385 11 
12 1997 19.1372  1993 32.0755  2016 17.4139  2003 36.5385 12 
13 2014 19.0307  2016 30.1887  2007 16.4739  1990 36.5385 13 
14 2015 18.4312  2007 28.8462  1997 16.3341  2016 35.8491 14 



















1 2008 40.6063  2009 51.9231  2000 52.3659  2000 67.3077 1 
2 2009 28.7925  2008 46.1538  2001 48.5823  2002 61.5385 2 
3 2001 23.9041  1998 42.3077  2008 35.3267  2001 61.5385 3 
4 2016 21.4325  2000 40.3846  2002 34.4546  2008 50.0000 4 
5 2011 21.2590  1997 40.3846  1998 32.4487  1999 49.0566 5 
6 2010 21.1865  2015 36.5385  2011 29.8203  2009 48.0769 6 
7 2002 20.6397  2001 36.5385  2009 29.0908  1998 44.2308 7 
8 2000 19.3637  2002 34.6154  2003 28.0922  2011 42.3077 8 
9 1998 19.2449  2016 33.9623  1999 27.9954  2003 42.3077 9 
10 1992 19.2035  2003 32.6923  1992 27.5150  1992 40.3846 10 
11 1997 18.3778  1992 32.6923  1995 25.5737  1993 37.7358 11 
12 2015 17.5312  1999 32.0755  1993 24.5855  1995 36.5385 12 
13 1999 16.9973  2011 30.7692  2004 23.4496  1991 34.6154 13 
14 1990 16.6178  2010 30.1887  1997 21.7572  1997 32.6923 14 

























1 1998 45.5930  2009 57.6923  2008 50.4654  2008 69.2308 1 
2 2015 42.9724  1999 56.6038  1987 37.6552  2009 67.3077 2 
3 2014 41.8967  2011 51.9231  2009 34.7781  2007 51.9231 3 
4 2008 40.9340  2014 50.0000  1998 26.0643  1987 50.0000 4 
5 1999 40.8248  2015 48.9362  2001 24.6354  1998 42.3077 5 
6 2012 39.8754  2013 48.0769  2007 23.9698  2001 40.3846 6 
7 2011 33.6441  1998 48.0769  2010 23.3425  2010 39.6226 7 
8 2013 33.4140  2012 46.1538  2011 22.0351  1986 38.4615 8 
9 2000 33.3201  2010 45.2830  2002 21.6112  2014 36.5385 9 
10 2009 33.2355  2008 44.2308  1986 20.3187  2011 36.5385 10 
11 2010 31.3972  1997 42.3077  2014 18.8292  1994 36.5385 11 
12 2001 31.1299  2000 34.6154  1990 18.6988  2015 34.6154 12 
13 1997 30.6134  2001 32.6923  2016 17.3470  2002 34.6154 13 
14 2016 28.9728  2016 32.0755  2000 17.2497  1990 32.6923 14 



















1 2008 45.8560 
 
2008 55.7692  2008 33.2408 
 
1998 76.9231 1 
2 2009 29.1440 
 
2009 50.0000  1998 31.7820 
 
2014 59.6154 2 
3 1998 28.1193 
 
1998 40.3846  2014 24.7682 
 
2008 55.7692 3 
4 2001 23.5154 
 
2010 33.9623  1988 23.6870 
 
2010 52.8302 4 
5 2011 22.9092 
 
2007 30.7692  2010 22.1164 
 
2016 50.9434 5 
6 2006 21.1417 
 
2006 30.7692  2011 21.2006 
 
2015 50.0000 6 
7 2010 20.6750 
 
2002 30.7692  2015 20.5779 
 
1997 50.0000 7 
8 1999 18.6570 
 
2011 28.8462  2016 19.3491 
 
2009 48.0769 8 
9 2002 18.5096 
 
1999 26.4151  1997 19.1329 
 
2011 46.1538 9 
10 2016 18.1036 
 
2001 25.0000  2001 18.8394 
 
1988 43.1373 10 
11 2007 17.8288 
 
2016 24.5283  2000 18.7302 
 
2007 42.3077 11 
12 2005 17.3425 
 
2005 23.0769  1989 18.6647 
 
2000 42.3077 12 
13 2014 17.0615 
 
2003 23.0769  1999 18.0941 
 
1999 41.5094 13 
14 2000 16.7580 
 
2014 21.1538  2009 17.9053 
 
2002 40.3846 14 
15 2003 15.8350 
 
1997 21.1538  1990 17.8543 
 
















1 2008 38.0421  2001 57.6923 
2 1998 28.6410  2000 55.7692 
3 2000 27.3161  2002 53.8462 
4 2001 27.0393  2008 48.0769 
5 2002 26.8213  2009 44.2308 
6 2011 26.7513  1998 44.2308 
7 1990 26.5180  2011 36.5385 
8 1987 25.8891  1990 34.6154 
9 1992 25.7377  1992 32.6923 
10 2009 25.5469  1991 32.6923 
11 1991 18.6649  1987 31.3725 
12 2010 18.6029  1999 30.1887 
13 2007 18.5062  2003 26.9231 
14 1994 18.0107  1994 26.9231 







Table 5. The top 15 year rankings of volatility as measured by standard deviation and 



















1 2008 43.6612  1993 91.6667  2008 31.4498  1998 91.6667 1 
2 2009 29.4802  2008 83.3333  1998 23.5242  1997 91.6667 2 
3 1998 29.1508  2005 83.3333  2002 21.6430  2009 83.3333 3 
4 1997 23.1339  2016 75.0000  1990 21.2586  2005 83.3333 4 
5 1993 21.8066  2015 75.0000  2009 21.0132  2004 83.3333 5 
6 2010 21.5577  1997 75.0000  2003 20.1805  2015 75.0000 6 
7 1992 21.3587  2012 66.6667  2015 19.1744  2008 75.0000 7 
8 1999 20.8975  2010 66.6667  2000 17.0880  1989 75.0000 8 
9 2015 20.4569  2009 66.6667  1997 16.5425  2014 66.6667 9 
10 2011 20.3502  2004 66.6667  1991 15.0907  2012 66.6667 10 
11 2012 18.0167  2002 66.6667  1989 13.9651  2010 66.6667 11 
12 2016 17.9077  1999 66.6667  2010 13.5704  1993 66.6667 12 
13 2001 17.7594  1998 66.6667  2001 13.3557  1990 66.6667 13 
14 2006 17.4930  1994 66.6667  1992 12.2344  2011 58.3333 14 



















1 2008 31.1409  2016 83.3333  2001 58.8500  2001 100.0000 1 
2 2009 24.3624  2002 83.3333  1992 39.5677  2004 91.6667 2 
3 1998 23.1493  1997 83.3333  2002 35.0402  2002 91.6667 3 
4 2001 22.9897  1992 83.3333  1999 34.1264  1998 91.6667 4 
5 2002 22.8876  2009 75.0000  1998 33.2609  1997 83.3333 5 
6 2003 21.2062  1990 75.0000  2009 29.9307  1994 83.3333 6 
7 1990 21.1136  2015 66.6667  1991 28.2831  1993 83.3333 7 
8 1992 20.2355  2010 66.6667  1995 26.0440  1987 81.8182 8 
9 2011 19.0249  2008 66.6667  2004 25.1911  2015 75.0000 9 
10 1997 18.5076  2005 66.6667  1994 24.9458  2011 75.0000 10 
11 2015 18.3247  2003 66.6667  2003 24.3057  2009 75.0000 11 
12 1994 17.1399  2001 66.6667  1997 24.2671  2000 75.0000 12 
13 2000 17.0473  1999 66.6667  2008 23.8874  1999 75.0000 13 
14 1993 16.0979  1993 66.6667  2000 21.2439  1992 75.0000 14 
























1 1998 56.6405  2010 91.6667  1987 45.1398  2008 100.0000 1 
2 2012 43.5045  2000 83.3333  2009 31.1825  2001 91.6667 2 
3 2015 40.4667  1997 83.3333  2008 30.2065  1992 91.6667 3 
4 1997 37.4118  2012 75.0000  1998 27.0171  2005 83.3333 4 
5 2009 37.1860  2009 75.0000  2002 26.6785  2002 83.3333 5 
6 2008 35.9283  2008 75.0000  1990 25.1560  1997 83.3333 6 
7 2013 35.1912  2003 75.0000  2010 23.3673  1990 83.3333 7 
8 2011 34.6977  2001 75.0000  1986 22.2488  1987 83.3333 8 
9 2000 33.8414  1999 75.0000  1991 22.1082  1985 83.3333 9 
10 2010 32.2309  2015 72.7273  2001 22.0702  1983 81.8182 10 
11 2001 31.0690  2016 66.6667  1988 21.2369  2009 75.0000 11 
12 2016 30.6310  2013 66.6667  2016 20.1764  1994 75.0000 12 
13 2003 27.3089  1998 66.6667  1984 19.1826  1986 75.0000 13 
14 2014 26.9293  2014 58.3333  2000 19.0909  1984 75.0000 14 



















1 2008 44.4863  2005 91.6667  1998 38.1811  1988 100.0000 1 
2 1998 32.4518  2008 83.3333  2008 29.8985  1998 91.6667 2 
3 2002 22.4656  2007 83.3333  1989 25.1228  1997 91.6667 3 
4 2001 21.7071  2003 83.3333  1988 24.5670  1994 91.6667 4 
5 2010 20.4839  2002 83.3333  2002 23.0465  2002 83.3333 5 
6 2003 20.1908  2001 83.3333  2000 21.9241  1999 83.3333 6 
7 2005 19.1972  2010 75.0000  1997 19.6740  1993 83.3333 7 
8 2009 18.2212  2009 75.0000  2015 19.2287  2015 75.0000 8 
9 1999 17.9293  2004 66.6667  2010 19.1633  2014 75.0000 9 
10 2011 16.7016  2000 66.6667  2014 18.4535  2012 75.0000 10 
11 2006 16.6438  1998 66.6667  2001 17.8566  2010 75.0000 11 
12 2000 16.5380  2006 58.3333  1994 17.1879  2009 75.0000 12 
13 2004 15.6969  1999 58.3333  2009 17.1818  2003 75.0000 13 
14 2012 13.8440  2015 50.0000  2007 16.3367  1989 75.0000 14 

















1 1987 37.0711  1997 91.6667 
2 1992 32.3222  2002 83.3333 
3 2002 31.7092  1987 83.3333 
4 2001 30.5038  2015 75.0000 
5 1990 29.5851  2001 75.0000 
6 1983 28.8175  1989 75.0000 
7 2008 28.7925  1988 75.0000 
8 1998 25.9940  1983 75.0000 
9 1994 21.7047  1981 75.0000 
10 1993 21.0375  2005 66.6667 
11 2000 20.9825  2003 66.6667 
12 1981 20.2546  1998 66.6667 
13 1997 19.9931  1994 66.6667 
14 1991 19.8585  1993 66.6667 







Table 6. Regression Results of Equity Mutual Fund Net Flows on Risk Measures for 
Small Eurozone Countries 






Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Panel A: Annual Observation with Financial Crisis Dummy Variable (Austria: n=17; Belgium: n=19) 
Constant 
 
2.4426 7.7979 6.9923 
 
2.4233 2.8781 0.3985 
 
0.77 3.98 3.88 
 
0.63 0.65 0.10 
GeoMean(t-1)   
9.5968 8.1307 26.7668 
 
0.0000 -6.0533 -1.5173 
 
0.81 0.82 2.08 
 
























   
0.7464 
   
1.1290 
   
2.65 
   
2.22 
PosExtr(t-1) 
   
-0.4502 
   
-1.7044 
   
-1.36 
   
-2.38 
Time  
-0.5968 -0.6136 -0.7059 
 
0.3782 0.4107 0.5843 
 
-2.15 -2.52 -3.17 
 
1.13 1.09 1.75 
Dummy Variable 
 
-9.7441 -9.3226 -10.7261 
 
-23.4073 -23.4763 -28.1261 
 
-2.43 -2.55 0.00 
 
-3.24 -3.14 -4.16 
Adjusted R Square 
 
0.3863 0.4860 0.0596 
 
0.3307 0.3567 0.5162 
  Austria (1996-2012)  Belgium (1995-2013) 
  
Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
 
Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Panel B: Annual Observation without Financial Crisis Variable (Austria: n=17; Belgium: n=19) 
Constant  
3.1549 7.9911 7.4769 
 
1.2937 1.4899 0.1372 
 
0.85 3.42 3.13 
 
0.27 0.27 0.02 
GeoMean(t-1)   
20.5567 19.7462 33.2442 
 
0.0000 38.4154 44.9684 
 
1.60 1.87 1.96 
 
- 1.13 1.27 
GeoStdDev(t-1)  
0.3679 





   
1.65 
  
TotalExtr(t-1)   
0.1914 





   
-0.08 
 
NegExtr(t-1)    
0.5542 
   
0.5583 
   
1.51 
   
0.78 
PosExtr(t-1)    
-0.2382 
   
-0.8332 
   
-0.55 
   
-0.83 
Time  
-0.7288 -0.7640 -0.8402 
 
0.1343 0.1481 0.2078 
 
-2.28 -2.71 -2.89 
 
0.32 0.32 0.44 
Adjusted R^2 
 
0.1541 0.2681 0.2698 
 






Table 6. Cont’d   Denmark (2003-2013)   Finland (1995-2012) 
    Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)   Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Panel A: Annual Observation with Financial Crisis Dummy Variable (Denmark: n=11; Finland: n=19) 
Constant 
-1.9165 -1.3322 -1.9737 
 
3.8327 2.4267 3.5382 
-1.03 -1.32 -1.58 
 
0.75 0.69 0.90 
GeoMean(t-1)  
-2.0470 -0.7117 5.0563 
 
-9.5690 -9.3994 -17.6914 
-0.34 -0.12 0.56 
 
-0.89 -0.88 -1.09 
GeoStdDev(t-1) 
0.0597 














   
-0.58 
 
NegExtr(t-1)   
0.2428 




   
-0.75 
PosExtr(t-1)   
-0.1350 




   
0.61 
Time 
0.5586 0.5399 0.5130 
 
0.4734 0.4853 0.4990 
3.98 3.88 3.54 
 
1.69 1.74 1.75 
Dummy Variable 
-1.0069 -1.0615 -0.9845 
 
-7.3596 -7.5456 -8.2332 
-0.77 -0.84 -0.76 
 
-1.61 -1.63 -1.70 
Adjusted R Square 
 
0.6288 0.6509 0.6385  0.0880 0.0857 0.0474 
 
 Denmark (2003-2013)   Finland (1995-2012) 
  
Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
 
Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Panel B: Annual Observation without Financial Crisis Variable (Denmark: n=11, Finland: n=18) 
Constant  
-1.8887 -1.4059 -2.0784 
 
3.3158 2.0470 2.5779 
 
-1.04 -1.43 -1.73 
 
0.62 0.55 0.62 
GeoMean(t-1)   
-0.5161 0.8002 6.7826 
 
-5.1050 -4.3124 -8.1711 
 
-0.09 0.14 0.81 
 
-0.47 -0.40 -0.50 
GeoStdDev(t-1)  
0.0510 





   
-0.42 
  
TotalExtr(t-1)   
0.0355 





   
-0.28 
 
NegExtr(t-1)    
0.2496 
   
-0.1825 
   
1.12 
   
-0.35 
PosExtr(t-1)    
-0.1499 
   
0.1332 
   
-0.77 
   
0.29 
Time  
0.5475 0.5297 0.5020 
 
0.3662 0.3778 0.3797 
 
4.04 3.91 3.61 
 
1.27 1.32 1.28 
Adjusted R^2 
 
0.6502 0.6658 0.6638 
 






Table 6. Cont’d    Greece (2003-2013)   Ireland (1995-2012) 
    Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)   Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Panel A: Annual Observation with Financial Crisis Dummy Variable (Greece: n=19, Ireland: n=11) 
Constant 
0.2781 0.0801 0.0839 
 
7.1932 5.6588 10.3754 
0.51 0.21 0.21 
 
0.97 1.24 0.84 
GeoMean(t-1)  
-0.4488 -0.3883 -0.3515 
 
22.5714 27.4193 -11.3329 
-0.42 -0.37 -0.29 
 
0.69 0.93 -0.12 
GeoStdDev(t-1) 
-0.0110 














   
-0.08 
 
NegExtr(t-1)   
-0.0006 




   
-0.42 
PosExtr(t-1)   
-0.0113 




   
0.41 
Time 
0.0110 0.0097 0.0096 
 
0.0117 -0.0972 -0.0750 
0.31 0.27 0.26 
 
0.01 -0.12 -0.09 
Dummy Variable 
-0.4872 -0.4651 -0.4999 
 
25.1384 25.4558 24.9086 
-0.79 -0.75 -0.61 
 
2.82 2.87 2.58 
Adjusted R Square 
 
-0.2057 -0.2200 -0.3134 
 
0.4184 0.4120 0.3181 
  Greece (2003-2013)   Ireland (1995-2012) 
  
Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
 
Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Panel B: Annual Observation without Financial Crisis Variable (Greece: n=19, Ireland: n=11) 
Constant  
0.2541 0.0804 0.0633 
 
10.8503 6.9073 15.5529 
 
0.47 0.21 0.16 
 
1.05 1.07 0.92 
GeoMean(t-1)   
-0.2048 -0.1601 -0.4038 
 
-36.2552 -26.9905 -96.2743 
 
-0.20 -0.16 -0.34 
 
-1.03 -0.84 -0.75 
GeoStdDev(t-1)  
-0.0098 





   
-0.51 
  
TotalExtr(t-1)   
-0.0054 





   
-0.23 
 
NegExtr(t-1)    
-0.0289 
   
-1.4663 
   
-0.49 
   
-0.57 
PosExtr(t-1)    
0.0195 
   
1.0958 
   
0.31 
   
0.53 
Time  
0.0050 0.0044 0.0068 
 
0.6344 0.4075 0.4284 
 
0.15 0.12 0.19 
 
0.54 0.36 0.36 
Adjusted R^2 
 
-0.1757 -0.1849 -0.2548 
 







 Table 6. Cont’d   Norway (1997-2013)   Portugal (1995-2013) 
    Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)   Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Panel A: Annual Observation with Financial Crisis Dummy Variable (Norway: n=17; Portugal: n=19) 
Constant 
0.6241 0.2738 0.4143 
 
4.2220 4.3452 4.1639 
0.76 0.59 0.63 
 
1.28 1.79 1.64 
GeoMean(t-1)  
-0.5150 -0.1188 -0.9350 
 
-19.0232 -19.4260 -13.6505 
-0.22 -0.05 -0.27 
 
-1.58 -1.58 -0.74 
GeoStdDev(t-1) 
-0.3677 














   
-0.04 
 
NegExtr(t-1)   
-0.0335 




   
0.42 
PosExtr(t-1)   
0.0274 




   
-0.43 
Time 
0.0244 0.0190 0.0173 
 
-0.2368 -0.2334 -0.2657 
0.49 0.38 0.33 
 
-1.18 -1.16 -1.21 
Dummy Variable 
-1.3454 -1.4294 -1.4458 
 
-9.5473 -9.5090 -10.5338 
-1.70 -1.84 -1.78 
 
-2.56 -2.57 -2.35 
Adjusted R Square 
 
0.0908 0.0751 -0.0002  0.2496 0.2496 0.2033 
  Norway (1997-2013)   Portugal (1995-2013) 
  
Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
 
Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 




0.9339 0.2795 0.3672 
 
5.1340 4.3824 4.7160 
  
1.09 0.55 0.51 
 
1.33 1.54 1.63 
GeoMean(t-1)  
 
0.2369 1.1121 0.6116 
 
-11.6650 -11.0451 -23.6160 
  
0.10 0.49 0.17 
 















   
-0.0207 
 
   
-0.62 




   
-0.0297 
   
-0.3403 
    
-0.31 
   
-0.87 
PosExtr(t-1) 
   
0.0083 
   
0.3022 
    
0.07 




0.0167 0.0051 0.0040 
 
-0.3115 -0.3185 -0.2403 
  
0.32 0.10 0.07 
 
-1.34 -1.37 -0.95 
Adjusted R^2 
 
-0.0409 -0.0943 -0.1824 
 










Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Panel A: Annual Observation (Sweden: n=19) 
Constant  
-5.6016 -1.3133 0.2287 
 
-0.60 -0.25 0.04 
GeoMean(t-1)   
-17.1531 -16.9401 -25.2051 
 













NegExtr(t-1)    
-0.5469 
   
-0.71 
PosExtr(t-1)    
0.8997 
   
1.10 
Time  
0.6340 0.6420 0.6337 
 
1.70 1.72 1.69 
Dummy Variable  
-11.8822 -11.9234 -9.4073 
 
-1.63 -1.63 -1.20 
Adjusted R^2 
 
0.1623 0.1586 0.1518 
  
Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Panel B: Annual Observation without Financial Crisis Variable (Sweden: n=19) 
Constant 
 
-6.4102 -1.8243 0.5465 
  
-0.65 -0.33 0.10 
GeoMean(t-1)  
 
-1.0663 -0.9150 -17.6518 
  
















   
-0.8457 
    
-1.15 
PosExtr(t-1) 
   
1.2330 




0.4964 0.5049 0.5346 
  
1.30 1.32 1.44 
Adjusted R^2 
 








Panel A: Pooled regression results of equity mutual fund net flows on risk measures, with no country fixed effect controlled. 
The countries examined are separated into two groups, individualism and collectivism, based on Hofstede’s culture dimension 
score of individualism vs. collectivism. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Model 1’ Model 2’ Model 3’ Model 4’ Model 5’ Model 6’ Model 7’ Model 8’ Model 9’ 
          
Geometric Mean (t-1) -9.045** -9.740** -9.053** -8.035 -8.224* -1.432 -6.569 -7.738 -5.112 
 (4.157) (4.025) (3.909) (5.072) (4.859) (4.079) (5.242) (4.963) (4.874) 
Geo. Std. Deviation (t-1) 0.00983 0.00239 -0.0907       
 (0.0561) (0.0573) (0.0697)       
Individualism  4.196***   4.647***   4.082***  
  (1.456)   (1.414)   (1.503)  
Individualism*Geo StdDev (t-1)   0.163***       
   (0.0553)       
Total Extreme Value (t-1)    -0.0632 -0.0780* -0.112**    
    (0.0435) (0.0418) (0.0511)    
Individualism*Total Extr (t-1)      0.112***    
      (0.0399)    
Negative Extreme Value (t-1)       0.0608 0.0580 0.105 
       (0.127) (0.123) (0.163) 
Positive Extreme Value (t-1)       0.00169 -0.0250 -0.220 
       (0.134) (0.133) (0.205) 
Individualism*Neg Extr (t-1)         0.0157 
         (0.217) 
Individualism*Pos Extr (t-1)         0.221 
         (0.255) 
GDP (t-1) 2.60e-05 -4.34e-05 -3.10e-05 1.99e-05 -5.86e-05** -1.60e-05 2.52e-05 -4.33e-05 -7.64e-06 
 (2.18e-05) (2.85e-05) (2.61e-05) (2.20e-05) (2.87e-05) (2.40e-05) (2.31e-05) (3.09e-05) (2.69e-05) 
Crisis -5.446* -5.240 -5.334* -3.034 -2.269 -1.459 -5.691* -5.460* -5.765* 
 (3.145) (3.186) (3.146) (2.726) (2.797) (2.689) (3.119) (3.180) (3.182) 
Constant 2.888* 3.486** 5.336*** 4.296*** 5.065*** 5.078*** 2.417** 3.142*** 3.860*** 
 (1.608) (1.600) (1.850) (1.274) (1.193) (1.344) (1.139) (1.112) (1.296) 
Fixed Effect No No No No No No No No No 
          
Observations 141 141 141 141 141 141 141 141 141 
R-squared 0.058 0.111 0.108 0.080 0.143 0.144 0.065 0.113 0.095 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 





Panel B: Pooled regression results of equity mutual fund net flows on risk measures, with country fixed effect controlled.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Model 1’ Model 2’ Model 3’ Model 4’ Model 5’ Model 6’ Model 7’ Model 8’ Model 9’ 
          
Geometric Mean (t-1) -8.278 -9.594 -10.10* -8.839 -9.429 -7.362 -9.733 -10.79 -8.674 
 (6.087) (5.644) (5.793) (6.681) (6.512) (6.883) (7.284) (7.062) (6.795) 
Geo. Std. Deviation (t-1) 0.0165 -0.00314 -0.105       
 (0.0581) (0.0604) (0.0782)       
Individualism  4.396***   4.446***   4.258***  
  (1.278)   (1.333)   (1.385)  
Individualism*Geo StdDev (t-1)   0.182***       
   (0.0450)       
Total Extreme Value (t-1)    0.0197 -0.00766 -0.0411    
    (0.0366) (0.0395) (0.0432)    
Individualism*Extreme Measure (t-1)      0.103***    
      (0.0207)    
Negative Extreme Value (t-1)       -0.0477 -0.0631 -0.0514 
       (0.151) (0.114) (0.0873) 
Positive Extreme Value (t-1)       0.142 0.0952 -0.0620 
       (0.174) (0.136) (0.191) 
Individualism*Neg Extr (t-1)         0.106 
         (0.129) 
Individualism*Pos Extr (t-1)         0.134 
         (0.218) 
GDP (t-1) 1.66e-05 -5.95e-05* -5.02e-05* 1.86e-05 -6.11e-05 -1.41e-05 2.45e-05 -5.22e-05 -1.77e-05 
 (1.93e-05) (3.20e-05) (2.61e-05) (2.11e-05) (3.67e-05) (2.40e-05) (2.18e-05) (3.66e-05) (2.49e-05) 
Crisis = o, - - - - - - - - - 
          
Constant 2.455 3.524* 5.595** 2.342 3.646** 3.630** 1.858 3.177** 3.902** 
 (1.763) (1.962) (2.204) (1.369) (1.617) (1.618) (1.159) (1.416) (1.539) 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Observations 141 141 141 141 141 141 141 141 141 
R-squared 0.011 0.084 0.088 0.012 0.085 0.065 0.021 0.087 0.066 
Number of year 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 








Table 8. Simultaneous Regression Results (2 Groups: Individualism vs Collectivism), 2SLS Estimates 
 
 Model (2’) Model (3’) Model (4’) Model (5’) Model (6’) 
VARIABLES Net Flow Geo.StDev Net Flow Geo.StDev Net Flow Total Extr. Net Flow Total Extr. Net Flow Total Extr. 
           
Geometric Mean (t-1) -2.872 8.552 -2.405 8.599 -2.158 15.76 -3.657 16.06 -2.196 16.05 
(5.514) (5.950) (5.513) (5.946) (5.419) (11.63) (5.299) (11.52) (5.335) (11.60) 
Geo. StdDev (t-1) 0.212**  0.125        
(0.0851)  (0.0951)        
Individualism 4.012*** -0.571     3.555** 4.321   
(1.505) (1.881)     (1.497) (3.642)   
Net Flow(t-1)  0.230**  0.219*  0.539**  0.461**  0.509** 
  (0.115)  (0.114)  (0.224)  (0.223)  (0.219) 
Individualism*Geo StdDev (t-1)   0.143**        
   (0.0559)        
Total Extr. (t-1)     0.106***  0.0896**  0.0313  
     (0.0372)  (0.0365)  (0.0495)  
Individualism*Total Extr. (t-1)         0.101**  
         (0.0451)  
GDP (t-1) -4.46e-05 -1.97e-05 -2.82e-05 -2.89e-05 2.78e-05 -0.000109 -3.13e-05 -0.000180* -1.48e-06 -0.000109 
(3.96e-05) (4.87e-05) (3.63e-05) (3.78e-05) (3.10e-05) (7.39e-05) (3.91e-05) (9.44e-05) (3.32e-05) (7.37e-05) 
Crisis -5.773*** 17.60*** -5.857*** 17.59*** -6.036*** 39.42*** -5.782*** 39.37*** -5.849*** 39.33*** 
 (1.949) (2.404) (1.948) (2.403) (1.962) (4.699) (1.913) (4.655) (1.936) (4.689) 
Constant -0.944 19.88*** 0.758 0.219* 0.887 17.71*** 1.603 18.35*** 0.0313 17.79*** 
 (2.331) (1.854) (2.529) (0.114) (1.679) (3.590) (1.657) (3.589) (0.0495) (3.582) 
Var(e.netflow) 44.53*** 44.51*** 45.20*** 42.82*** 43.92*** 
 (5.851) (5.836) (5.607) (5.304) (5.450) 
Var(e.risk) 67.22*** 67.11*** 256.6*** 252.0*** 255.8*** 
 (8.188) (8.162) (31.250) (30.590) (31.02) 
Covariance -21.94*** -21.35*** -39.22*** -37.81*** -38.99*** 
 (6.760) (6.778) (11.910) (11.340) (11.53) 
           
Observations 141 141 141 141 141 141 141 141 141 141 
Standard errors in parentheses 











For our study  
Dummy =  
individualism (1)  
vs. Collectivism (0)  
 
1 United States 91 N/A 
2 United Kingdom 89 N/A 
3 Canada 80 N/A 
3 Netherland 80 N/A 
5 Italy 76 N/A 
6 Belgium 75 Individualism 
7 Denmark 74 Individualism 
8 France 71 N/A 
8 Sweden 71 Individualism 
10 Ireland 70 Individualism 
11 Norway 69 Individualism 
12 Switzerland 68 N/A 
13 Germany 67 N/A 
14 Finland 63 Collectivism 
15 Austria 55 Collectivism 
16 Spain 51 N/A 
17 Japan 46 N/A 
18 Greece 35 Collectivism 
19 Portugal 27 Collectivism 
 
[dataset] Hofstede, G., 2001. The 6-D model of national culture: country comparison. 
https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country-comparison/ 
 
 
 
